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Abstract
In the United States, about 28 lives are lost daily in motor vehicle accidents that
involve an alcohol-impaired driver. While most states have enacted traffic-safety
laws to address this phenomenon, little consensus exists on the causal impact of
these laws in reducing drunk-driving fatalities. This paper exploits quasi-random
variation in state-level laws to estimate the causal effect of select traffic laws on the
frequency of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver. This is identified from the
discontinuities in policy treatments among homogeneous contiguous-counties that
are separated by a shared state border. This approach addresses the econometric
issues created due to spatial heterogeneity that may have biased previous stud-
ies. We present convincing evidence that the estimates in the literature are prone
to an upward bias. Further, if the effective laws were adopted as a federal man-
date in 1986, they could have prevented about 24% of drunk-driving motor-vehicle
fatalities.
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1 Introduction
In the United States, having access to a motor vehicle has become one of the essential conveniences
of modern life. From 1990, survey estimates have consistently shown over 90% of households having
access to this commodity. Operating a motor vehicle, however, is not without its fair share of risks,
evident by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) ranking motor vehicle accidents as the
number one leading cause of preventable death among teens and the 13th leading cause of preventable
deaths in the U.S in 2013. This hazard is compounded by risky behavior by some economic agents,
such as speeding or driving while impaired. The National Center for Statistics and Analysis (2015)
estimates that across all states in 2014, alcohol-impaired-driving fatalities accounted for between 20
percent (Vermont) and 41 percent (Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Texas) of the total count of
traffic fatalities, with a national average of 31 percent. On a daily basis, there are 28 recoded deaths
in motor vehicle accidents that are due primarily to an alcohol-impaired driver, with one of such loss
of life occurring every 53 minutes. This also carries an estimated annual cost of $44 billion dollars
resulting from lost productivity, legal, court and medical related expenses, property damage, and
insurance administration. Consequently, the issue of traffic safety is a major health concern not only
to those directly involved, but to society as a whole.
Policymakers have long advocated that these outcomes can be mitigated through the use of strict
traffic laws that mandate safe motor vehicle operation, adequately punish offenders, and are robustly
enforced. As a result, traffic laws have played a dual function of both maintaining the orderly flow
of traffic as well as creating an incentive structure which dissuades individuals from engaging in
any activity which could potentially lead to harm. Policymakers have attempted to legislate how
vehicles are used on public carriageways, including placing speed limits, mandating seatbelt use, and
restricting licenses among other measures. Many states have also implemented measures aimed at
discouraging certain behavior by targeting those that are most likely to become perpetrators. For
example, some states have implemented taxes aimed at making alcohol consumption more expensive;
reducing excessive drinking and essentially passing through the cost of the negative externalities
created through alcohol consumption to those who cause the externalities. At the extensive margin,
alcohol taxes increases the cost associated with alcohol consumption and as such should deter some
individuals from drinking or at the very least reduce the quantity of alcohol individuals consume.
If this pigovian tax is effective, then it should reduce the level of inefficiency created by alcohol
consumption and as such should reduce the frequency of individuals being at risk by driving while
intoxicated.
This study exploits the across state variation in traffic laws to establish the causal impact of state-
level legislation on traffic and drunk driving related fatalities. We argue that the implementation
of and/or removal of pigovian taxes, historical laws, and traditional legislative restrictions creates a
natural experiment that can be used to causally identify the effect of alcohol restrictions and drunk-
driving punishments on the number of drunk-driving fatalities. This is done within a contiguous
county specification which controls for spatial heterogeneity. By restricting our analysis to laws that
are quasi-random and our sample to county pairs that share the same border, we are able to exploit
the policy discontinuities at the state border to identify the treatment effect of each law of interest.
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The contiguous counties identification approach utilized in this paper follows the earlier studies by
Huang (2008) and Dube et al. (2010)1. In this paper, we present several specifications tests and
convincing evidence of the causal relationship that we seek to establish.
In our preferred specification, we found that the most effective laws in reducing drunk-driving
fatalities are: alcohol tax rate, open container laws, zero tolerance laws that create a blood alcohol
concentration(BAC) limit of 0.02 g/dL and very harsh penalties for the first incidence of driving under
the influence. Through a simple simulation using the estimated parameters, we show that available
legislative solutions to this problem have been under utilized by policymakers over our sample period.
Consequently, our results suggest that these tools can be used to address this widespread public health
issue if they are employed at the federal level. Had the effective laws been implemented uniformly
across states, the level of drunk driving fatalities would be about 24 percent lower annually. Further,
a small increase in the alcohol tax rate over the period would have reduced the level of drunk driving
fatalities by approximately 1 percent.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows: Section II provides a brief overview of the
related literature. Section III describes the data we utilized, the model specification and provides
an outline of the identification strategy utilized. Section IV provides the empirical estimates and
robustness checks. Section V outlines the policy implications and the major conclusions derived from
this study.
2 Literature
Time series and state-level panel anaysis are often used to assess the effectiveness of changing a
particular traffic law. While it is possible to control for some relevant factors, these methodologies are
particularly prone to the adverse influence of unobserved heterogeneity arising from spatial differences
in individual behavior that may be correlated with drunk-driving law changes. For example, the
state policymakers decision to increase the beer tax rate or reduce the acceptable BAC limit may be
dependent on the trends in drunk-driving fatalities, the political leaning of the state legislature or the
general economic environment of the state. The wide-ranging impact of traffic fatalities is reflected
in the plethora of studies that have been conducted to assess the impact of traffic laws on traffic
safety outcomes. The robustness of these studies have often been questioned due to the variances in
results and a lack of a coherent narrative across the studies. The differences in methodology, mainly
the extent to which spatial heterogeneity is accounted for, and variation in sample sizes, may have
contributed to this lack of consistency. These studies have assessed the impact of alcohol control
legislations (Freeman, 2007; Foss et al., 2001; Fell and Voas, 2006; Chaloupka et al., 1993), license
laws (Fell et al., 2011; Shope, 2007; Williams and Shults, 2010), driving restrictions and vehicle
operation rules (Ossiander and Cummings, 2002).
Alcohol control legislations can be divided into two categories, namely preventive or ex-post reg-
ulations(Ying et al., 2013). On the one hand, preventative regulations seek to limit the public’s
access to alcohol by increased prices (tax laws), limiting access (blue laws), and restricting posses-
sion (open container laws). On the other hand, ex-post laws seek to punish those that are guilty
1These studies utilized this approach in the Financial and Labor Economics literature.
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of driving while impaired (DWI) by establishing minimum punishments, gradations of guilt, and
licensing restrictions. The effectiveness of these regulations is not consistent across the literature,
with variations in data and methodology predicting varying effects.
The estimated impact of the BAC law on traffic fatalities provide just one example of this incon-
sistency found in the literature. While some studies suggest that BAC laws, specifically the lowering
of the BAC threshold, do not have a significant impact on traffic fatalities (Freeman, 2007; Foss et al.,
2001), others find that this law can be meaningfully used as policy lever to address this phenomena
(Fell and Voas, 2006; Eisenberg, 2003; Wagenaar et al., 2001; Dee, 2001). The differences between the
results of these studies is attributed to inconsistencies in the time period employed (Freeman, 2007)
and the use of intra or inter-state comparisons (Foss et al., 2001). Similarly, early studies into the
effectiveness of beer excise taxes suggested that they were very effective in reducing traffic fatalities, a
narrative that has not been consistently supported by later studies. The earlier studies found that in-
creasing the beer tax rate reduced the total level of fatal traffic accidents across all age groups(Cook,
1981; Saffer and Grossman, 1987). These studies were subsequently challenged on the basis that they
did not adequately address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity(Dee, 1999). More recent studies
have suggested that increasing the beer tax either has a small effect (Chaloupka et al., 1993) or an
insignificant impact (Mast et al., 1999; Young and Likens, 2000; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2006)
on traffic fatalities.
The effectiveness of DUI fines and Administrative License Revocations (ALR) have been explored
by many studies in the literature. The estimated impact of these laws have varied profusely across
states and studies. As such, while some studies have found DUI fines to be effective in reducing
traffic fatalities (Chaloupka et al., 1993; Wagenaar et al., 2007; Wilkinson, 1987), other studies find
dissimilar results (Young and Likens, 2000). Mixed results have also been found for ALR laws(Ying
et al., 2013).
The laws that seek to improve traffic safety and reduce the risk of an accident by regulating how
vehicles are operated, such as seat belt and speed limit legislations, are often found to be negatively
associated with traffic fatality rates (Freeman, 2007; Cohen and Einav, 2003). However, there is a
lack of concurrence on the magnitude and significance of these effects. Cohen and Einav (2003) point
out that the effectiveness of seat belt laws is often overestimated in the literature. They posit that
more accurate data, in terms of percentage of seat belt usage, and differentiating between primary
and secondary enforcement allows for a clearer picture of the effectiveness of seat belt laws. They
also point out that the ability of their study to exploit interstate variation in seat belt laws allowed
for more accurate modeling of the effect of seat belt laws.
Given the high propensity of young drivers to be involved in fatal crashes, there has been an
effort to extend greater control on how this cohort operates motor vehicles. Graduate Driver’s
License (GDL) laws encompass a number of measures that seek to restrict vehicle operation by
young individuals. The extent to which GDL laws are implemented by states vary widely and the
significance of their impact on fatal accidents has varied across states and studies as a result(Fell et al.,
2011; Shope, 2007). Despite these variances, there is a consensus in the literature that GDL laws are
effective in reducing the rate of teen involvement in traffic accidents and fatal crashes, specifically for
16 and 17 year olds (Chen et al., 2006; Fell et al., 2011; Shope, 2007). There is, however, evidence
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that the benefits of such laws do not extend past the immediately impacted cohort (Chen et al.,
2006) and even a suggestion that strong GDL laws were associated with increased involvement in
fatal crashes by the 18 year old cohort(Masten et al., 2011).
Despite the plethora of related studies within the field, there remains a high level of inconsistency
in the results. The tendency for studies to utilise state-level panels and time series data makes their
findings susceptible to issues of spatial heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. Consequently, there
remains a need for a more comprehensive analysis of the average effect of these laws, addressing the
concerns raised by previous studies. We propose the contiguous-counties model as an approach that
could provide meaningful insight about some of the questions raised about previous studies. This
approach should yield estimates that are unbiased and consistent across sub-samples.
3 Data and Empirical Specification
In this section, we provide a general overview of the data, selection restrictions and methods we
employ in the paper. We begin with a description of the key sources of the data in section 3.1,
sample restrictions in section 3.2, descriptive statistics in 3.3 and then concluding with the empirical
model specification in section 3.4.
3.1 Data
To be consistent and for ease of comparability with the previous studies in the literature, we uti-
lize data on traffic fatalities from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). This dataset is
compiled by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) using data reported by
various state-level agencies. It is comprised of fatal accidents involving a motor vehicle being used on
any traffic-way that is open to the public within any of the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
To qualify for inclusion, the incident must have resulted in the death of an involved party within 30
days of the crash.
The quality of this data should be reasonably high, since coding manuals are provided with a
set of instructions on how coders can transfer information from a police accident/crash report to
the FARS; several classes are held annually to train coders and system wide meetings are held to
encourage uniform coding practices. The data is collected in a very organized manner, with several
regional NHTSA offices and several trained FARS analysts collecting, transcribing and transmitting
their state’s data to the centralized system in a standard form. These analysts consult several records
including; death certificates, coroner/medical examiner reports, hospital records, vital statistics police
reports and the state highway department data. For each county, we begin by aggregating the total
number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver and the total number of overall fatal accidents2.
To check the robustness of our estimates and to appropriately address the potential concerns of our
readers, we also provide estimates from models involving these outcomes calculated for various days
of the week and times of a given day.
2It should be noted that the county observed in the FARS dataset is the location where the accident occurred
and not the driver’s county of residence. This raises concern of a potential migration bias. This is more extensively
discussed in section 4
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We also utilize data on state traffic laws from the State Health Policy Research Dataset (SHEPRD).
This dataset was created to examine state-level public health laws from 1980-2010 and features laws
such as taxes on packaged beer, minimum and maximum fines and other forms of traffic rules such
as seatbelt and graduated license laws. Compilation of the data set was facilitated by the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation and the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the
National Institute of Health and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. We focus
on the period 1986-2005, since the majority of the changes in traffic laws occurred during this period
and since this time period minimizes the number of missing laws we have in our dataset. This results
in a balanced dataset consisting of traffic laws and outcomes over a 20 year period, for 49 states.
Finally, to ensure we are adequately accounting for the size of the county in our analytical
framework, we collect county-level population data from the US Census Bureau and land area data
from Dube, Lester and Reich (2010) to complete our dataset. Given the method we employ, we have
compiled one of the largest aggregated dataset to be used in the literature to date, which should also
lead to an efficiency advantage over previous studies.
3.2 Sample Restrictions
The balanced dataset utilized in this study was comprised of observations at the county level over
the period 1986-2005. The contiguous border counties sample (CBCS) is further restricted using the
population sizes and land area disparities within each contiguous county pair. Given our criticism
of the heterogeneous comparison groups utilized in previous studies, this study further restricts the
sample by dropping county-pairs where the difference in the size of the land area (in squared miles)
and population within the pairs are too large. This saw county-pairs having the top 5% of disparity
in land area or population being omitted from the sample. Consequently, for each pair within this
sample, we calculate the within pair absolute difference in the land area and population counts.
The county pairs belonging to the tail (defined as being beyond the 95th percentile) of the resulting
distribution are omitted from our analysis3. This relies on the plausible assumption that county-pairs
that are comprised of counties with similar land area and population size are more homogeneous.
This prevents us from comparing very big counties (either in land area or population) to very small
counties that are by nature less similar. Through the use of contiguous county-pairs across state lines,
eliminating county pairs where the within pair variation in land area and population are outliers
and by using county-pair by year fixed effects, this study has employed the largest combination
of measures to address the issue of spatial heterogeneity (common time trend) that studies in this
literature have utilized to date. Finally, we omit Hawaii and Alaska from our analysis for obvious
reasons.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Columns 1 and 2 in table 1 below shows the mean and standard deviation for the contiguous-counties
sample and columns 3 and 4 shows the mean and standard deviation for all counties in the US. The
restrictions imposed on our CBCS reduces the disparities in the observed characteristics within
3The qualitative conclusions do not change when we include the omitted 5%.
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each pair by design. This can easily be seen from table 1, where the standard deviations from the
contiguous counties sample are sufficiently smaller than those from the sample including all counties,
though the mean values from both samples are very similar4. Across both samples, the average
number of fatal crashes involving an intoxicated driver was approximately 11 per hundred thousand
population.
Table 1: County Level Descriptive Statistics 1986-2005
Mean[1] Std. Deviation [2] Mean[3] Std. Deviation[4]
Number of Fatal Crashes (Drunk) 10.84 14.82 10.72 17.89
GDP Per Capita 27573.07 7791.85 27996.28 7822.51
Poverty Rate 13.32 3.75 13.38 3.61
Motor Vehicle Reg. in 000s 4493.73 3763.26 5470.53 4677.99
Population 56371.44 101678.20 84729.59 279100.10
Land Area (square miles) 1000.40 1230.58 1114.36 3472.10
While these descriptive statistics do not provide conclusive evidence that the CBCS solves the
problem of spatial heterogeneity, this table offers two key insights. First, since our preferred specifi-
cation is identified from the variation in traffic policies within each contiguous border county pair,
it is necessary that the counties observed characteristics within each pair are similar. Through our
restriction of omitting pairs where the difference in population or land area is ’too large’, we are able
to reduced the standard deviation in the observed characteristics across all pairs. Since the devia-
tion from the mean characteristics in the CBCS is noticeably smaller than in the sample including
all counties, this suggests that there is a higher degree of homogeneity in the former. Second, the
restrictions we imposed at the pair level and the use of only contiguous counties led to very large
counties (in terms of population size and land area) being omitted. This is necessary since these
counties are unlikely to be similar in observed and unobserved characteristics to other counties. Both
of these observations offers moderate support to the identification framework we exploit. However,
given the multi-dimensional space of the policies/treatment we are evaluating, we are unable to offer
stronger evidence of comparability.
Table 2 provides a summary of the policies we examine in this study. Since the identification
framework utilized in this paper relies on the changes in policies within each contiguous county pair,
this table shows the mean value for these laws across all states and the number of states that have
changed each law over the period of study. For each discrete variable (e.g. a law prohibiting open
containers in cars), the third column shows the difference in the number of states who had the law
in 1986 and those who had the law in 2005. For the continuous variables (e.g. tax rate on packaged
beer), we present the change in the mean value of the variable from 1986 to 2005.
The table shows that there is sufficient variation in state traffic legislations over the period to
identify the model we present below. The only laws which offer a cause for concern is mandated
prison time for drivers committing their first DUI5.
4This conclusion does not hold for the population and land area variables, since these were used to restrict our
CBCS. Therefore, the two samples will be different along these dimensions by design
5A closer inspection of this variable show changes in the average across years. This suggest that some states are
implementing the policy while others are repealing it.
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Table 2: State Level Descriptive Statistics
Mean [1] Std. Deviation[2] Change 2005-1986[3]
BAC Limit of 0.08 g/dL (adults) 0.3 0.46 48
Underage BAC Limit of 0.02 g/dL 0.57 0.49 45
State Beer Tax ($ per gallon) 0.23 0.17 0.05
Law Prohibiting Open Containers in Cars 0.50 0.50 27
Beer Keg Registration Required 0.25 0.43 22
Mandated Min Fine 1st DUI 139.35 186.01 131.63
Mandated Comm. Service 1st DUI 0.38 0.49 -12
License Susp. Pre-Con. 1st DUI 0.64 0.48 21
Mandated prison time 1st DUI 0.33 0.47 1
Marginal GDL 0.15 0.36 14
Good GDL 0.18 0.38 31
Bicycle Helmet Use 0.21 0.40 18
Seatbelt Fine 0.82 0.38 0.71
3.4 Empirical Model Specification
3.4.1 Traditional Specification
Previous studies have predominantly utilized a panel of states to evaluate the effect of traffic legisla-
tions in explaining traffic fatalities. The results obtained by these studies are potentially biased since
they utilize econometric specifications which typically compare the fatality rates in states that have
enacted a particular traffic law(s) to those that did not. These approaches assume that each state
legislature’s decision to implement these laws are independent of all omitted factors (state’s political
and economic environment) which potentially influences individuals’ decision to drive while intoxi-
cated or the count of fatal accidents in the state. Consequently, the extent of the bias will depend
on the degree to which the pre-implementation trend in fatality counts in the state(s) which enact
various traffic laws differ from those who do not implement these laws and the ability of previous
studies to include variables which control for all the factors driving these differences. Due to the
high degree of heterogeneity between the states in these samples, the usual practice of including time
and state fixed effects yield little additional benefits in providing estimates that can be interpreted
causally. Studies in the literature that have utilized time series approaches may suffer from similar
issues of model misspecification or changing trends in fatalities over time. Time series studies rely on
the assumption that the intervention is exogenous, which is usually not satisfied in this environment.
While a majority of the previous studies provide us with key descriptive insights in understanding the
impact of traffic rules on driving related fatalities; there is still a need for robust estimates produced
using a method which address the limitations pointed out in the previous literature. We propose that
the method utilized in this study may be able to bridge this gap in a meaningful way. We begin by
estimating models which replicates the previous studies using several methods employed in previous
works.
We begin with the model that is most often utilized. This specification can be expressed as
follows:
Fst = α + Tstpi +Xstφ+ θs + θt + εst
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Where Fst is the number of total fatalities or fatalities involving a drunk driver in state s at time
t, T is a vector of traffic laws, θs is state-level fixed effect and θt are time fixed effects. To test this
approach robustly, we also include other state-level controls that potentially explain the differences
in the fatality trends observed across states and may also be correlated with the timing of the
implementation of traffic laws. However, under even the most robust specification of this model, there
is a high likelihood that the necessary condition E(εst|Tst, Xst) = 0 is not satisfied due to the high
degree of heterogeneity which exists among states. Before presenting our most preferred empirical
specification, we also show that utilizing all counties in the united states would also provide estimates
that are expectedly unreliable. This is because we are still comparing very distinct groups, each
possessing a time trend in the outcome variable that may be distinctive. Therefore, the differences
in the time trend between counties pre- and post-interventions are likely to lead us to conclude a
false positive in judging the effectiveness of the intervention. The specification we are using for the
all counties sample is:
Fct = α + Tstpi +Xstφ+ θc + θt + εct
Identification in this model requires that E(εct|Tst, Xst) = 0, which is not satisfied. There are
a number of unobservables that are potentially correlated with T and also affect driving fatalities.
Therefore, differences in wealth, education or even racial composition could easily violate this exo-
geneity of treatment assumption that is required to estimate causal parameters.
3.4.2 Identification from Discontinuities at Contiguous State Borders: Contiguous
Counties Approach
Our preferred specification proposes a more generalized difference in difference strategy which exploits
the variation in adopted traffic laws between contiguous counties pairs across border states to causally
identify our parameters of interest. In advancing this approach in the current literature, we cautiously
subscribe to the view that a contiguous county method utilizes more homogeneous control groups
than approaches which employ a contiguous states approach, those just randomly comparing states
in general or any approach utilizing all counties in the US. Additionally, this panel approach allows us
to difference out between county-pair variation which may affect the outcome. By including county-
pair specific fixed effects, we identify our results using only the variation in the policies of interest
which occur within the thousands of contiguous county pairs we utilize. That is, this approach relies
on the changes in traffic legislation which occurs within each across-state contiguous county-pair for
identification of the parameters. As such, the identifying assumption is that policy differences within
county-pairs are uncorrelated with differences in residual driving fatalities in either county.
Another main benefit of using this approach is that the county pair specific time trend absorbs
the unobserved heterogeneity that previous approaches have ignored. The preferred specification
using this approach is given by:
Fcpt = α + Tstpi +Xstφ+ θc + νpt + εcpt
Where c, p, t indexes counties, pairs and time; νpt is the county-pair by year fixed effects and
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our outcome and errors are now defined at the county-time level within each contiguous county pair
extending across a state border. Under this specification,a causal interpretation is more likely to be
achieved as the assumption E(εcpt|Tst, Xst, νpt) = 0 is now satisfied.
4 Empirical Findings
In this section, we present results from the conventional specifications and contrast these with the
estimates from the contiguous-border county-pair specification we propose in this study. In all
models, where possible, we include controls for smoking legislations (laws restricting cigarette ads,
bar and indoor smoking bans and cigarette taxes); State GDP per capita, measures of state ideological
leanings, minimum wage, population and multiple measures of policing. The outcome of interest in
all models is the number of drunk driving fatalities per one-hundred thousand population.
In the main specifications, we present the estimated impact of the laws that are most directly
related to drunk driving prevention. In table 3-6, rows 1-2 focus on law restricting alcohol use prior
to operating a vehicle. This includes dummy variables capturing the presence of a BAC limit of
0.08g/dl for adults and a BAC limit of 0.02 g/dl for drivers under legal drinking age. Row 3 captures
the impact of directly increasing the price of alcoholic beverages. Rows 4-5 capture the impact of
laws restricting where an individual may possess an open alcoholic beverage and who can purchase a
Keg. Finally, rows 6 to 9 capture the penalty for being caught driving under the influence (minimum
fine, community service, license suspension, mandatory prison time).
4.1 Traditional and Contiguous-Counties Estimates
We begin the empirical analysis by estimating the effect of traffic laws on drunk-driving fatalities
using the traditional specifications. These results are presented in table 3. The estimated parameters
presented in Column 1 utilises state-level panel data, with added controls for state and year fixed
effects. Columns 2 and 3 then utilise data for all counties in the US, with controls for state-level
time trends and county level fixed-effects, respectively. We also include the set of controls discussed
above where possible. All standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
The estimates from table 3 suggests that only laws restricting alcohol use prior to operating a
vehicle are effective in reducing drunk-driving fatalities. These estimates suggest that having a BAC
limit of 0.08 g/dL for adults and 0.02 g/dL for minors each reduced drunk-driving fatalities by about
.4 per one-hundred population. For the other laws of interest, while most had the expected negative
sign, they were not significant at conventional levels. Additionally, while the point estimates are
consistent across all specifications, the county-level estimates are less precise. However, the estimates
in this table are unreliable because there is credible evidence against the exogeneity assumption being
satisfied in the state and all-counties specifications. For each law, the high degree of heterogeneity
between treated and untreated states/counties could induce bias in the estimated parameters in a
manner we cannot intuitively predict.
Turning our attention to the paper’s main contribution to the literature, table 4 presents the
estimates from the contiguous-counties specification. Column 1 shows the baseline specification that
9
controls for county and state-level time-varying covariates and any factors that are fixed within-
county over the sample period. However, this model does not control for the unobserved time
varying factors within each contiguous-counties border-pairs. Column 2 then introduces the county
pair specific time trend which restricts our empirical identification to the variation in traffic laws
within each contiguous counties border-pair. We present Column 2 as our preferred specification,
since it relies on within pair variation in traffic laws and controls for any unobserved time-varying
factors common to both counties within each pair.
The estimates from the contiguous-counties border-pair specification in table 4 are much larger
relative to those presented in table 3. The specification in column 1 of table 4 is comparable to
that of column 3 in table 3, though the former uses all counties and the latter uses only contiguous
counties. Comparing these two results, we can discern that just the act of using a more homogeneous
sample increases the estimated impact of the laws. For example, the impact of taxes on packaged
beer and open container laws increase in both magnitude and statistical significance moving from the
all-counties sample in column 3 of table 3 to the contiguous-counties sample in column 1 of table 4.
This suggests that spatial heterogeneity in the state-level and all-counties samples induce an upward
bias in the estimates.
However, while the contiguous-counties border-pair sample reduces the degree of the heterogeneity
between counties, the specification in table 4 column 1 only corrects for the fixed county-specific and
time-specific unobservable factors affecting drunk driving fatalities. As such, the unobserved time
varying factors correlated with the implementation of various traffic legislations may yet be another
source of endogeneity. To address this issue, we include a county-pair specific time fixed effect in the
results presented in table 4 column 2. This is identified from the assumption that differences in traffic
legislation within each contiguous county-pair is uncorrelated with the differences in the residual
levels of driving fatalities between the counties in each pair. Under our preferred specification, we
find that open container, tax rate on packaged beer, BAC limits for young drivers, and mandatory
prison for first DUI violation are effective in reducing drunk driving fatalities. If these estimates
are more reflective of the population parameters, it indicates that the traditional specifications are
biased upwards. As such, using the traditional approaches may lead to misleading conclusions about
the effectiveness of each traffic law.
In general, the contiguous-border county-pair estimates suggest that the most effective legislations
in reducing drunk-driving fatalities are the non-pecuniary measures directly related to alcohol use,
drunk driving or accident prevention, such as open container law, beer tax, license suspension or
prison time for the first DUI incident, and alcohol limits for young drivers. This suggests that a
mixture of preventative and ex-post laws can be effective in limiting the incidents of drinking and
driving. Additionally, the result highlights the effectiveness of taxes on packaged beer in forcing
individuals to internalize some of the negative externalities created when they drink and drive. Such
excise sin taxes disincentives individuals from engaging in risky behavior that may result in traffic
fatalities. In contrast, it suggests that drivers do not change their risky behavior in response to harsh
pecuniary penalties. This is supported by the insignificant result found for the minimum fine.
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4.2 Robustness Checks
The main result questions the validity of the estimates in the literature. While it may be easy
to convince readers that any estimation procedure that fails to account for the issues of spatial
heterogeneity or omitted variables would yield parameters that are biased, it is not as easy to convince
them that the contiguous county-pair specification adequately addresses this issue. To make the case
for the empirical design we employed in this study, we present falsification tests in this section to
show the robustness of the main results. To achieve this, we focus on time periods where we expect
particular laws to have a predictable impact on individual behavior. Particularly, we examine the
impact of traffic legislations in preventing drunk driving fatalities during Fridays and Saturdays
12AM to 3AM, Holidays (Fourth of July, Thanksgiving and New Years Day) and rush hour periods
(Monday to Thursday from 3PM to 6PM). The first and second period of interest have the most
notable spikes in the level of drunk driving fatalities. During these periods, we have a highly selective
sample inclusive of riskier drivers who are less likely to respond to traffic laws and more likely to
be intoxicated. That is, when we restrict our attention to a time period when drivers are less likely
to be responsive to traffic rules, we should find that these rules are less ineffective. For example, it
is intuitive that it would take a much larger increase in the beer tax rate to dissuade the average
individual from drinking during happy hour than is necessary during the normal work hours. On the
other hand, during the Monday to Friday rush hour period, it is plausible to expect that the risk
preferences of the average driver to be closer to our core sample. Under these conditions, it would be
counterintuitive if any law(s) that was insignificant in the main specification, is now found to have
an impact.
Table 5 show the results of the robustness checks for the state-level specification. In the sub-
samples focusing on Holidays, and Friday and Saturdays 12-3AM, more laws become statistically
significant though the magnitude of the effect reduces across all laws. In the rush hour subsample,
all laws were found to be statistically insignificant. As such, the conventional estimates suggest that
traffic laws are more effective when considering sub-populations with a higher risk tolerance. In
contrast, the contiguous county-pair result in table 6 finds that the laws became generally ineffective
in curbing drunk driving fatalities in each subsample. Across all subsamples using this econometric
specification, the estimated effect reduces. Also, all previously ineffective laws continue to have no
impact on this phenomena. As such, while the contiguous counties econometric specification produce
intuitive results across all subsamples.
The second robustness check looks at the impact of laws that are not directly related to drunk-
driving on drunk-driving fatalities. This is done for the main sample and for the three sub-samples
above. We also compare the performance of the conventional estimates to the contiguous-counties
estimates under these demanding conditions. We expect that these laws should have no impact on
drunk driving fatalities during holidays, rush hour intervals, and during Fridays and Saturdays 12-
3AM. The results are presented in table 76. The laws of interest in this falsification test: whether the
state possesses a good graduated licensing system, bike helmet laws, law imposing a fine for seat-belt
non-use, and a law which reduces damages for seatbelt non-use.
The conventional state-level specification produce implausible estimates when used to estimate
6All specifications in table 7 include the previous laws and the full set of controls discussed above where possible.
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laws that do not directly impact drunk-driving fatalities. For example, the conventional estimates
suggest that a law that reduces accidental damages for seatbelt non-use increases drunk-driving
fatalities. In contrast, the contiguous counties specification produces estimates that are plausible
and intuitive across all sub-samples. In general, the preferred specification show that these laws had
no impact on drunk driving fatalities when assessing sub-samples with a higher share of risky drivers.
These falsification tests show that given the main results, the contiguous county-pair specification
produces plausible estimates under restrictive conditions. In contrast, the traditional specification
fails to consistently produce plausible estimates when used to estimate the effect of traffic laws in
restrictive environments. These results support the argument that there are major concerns about
the robustness of the traditional specification.
4.3 Main Threats to Causality: Migration Bias
Estimating the true effect of a policy becomes troublesome when the treatment is based on geo-
graphical location and individuals can migrate either to avoid or to be included in the treatment.
In the context of our study, this would be a problem if there exists sufficient migration across state
borders in response to changes to traffic legislations such that the counties within each contiguous
county-pair become highly heterogeneous. Consider two contiguous counties, A belonging to state X
and B belong to state Y. Let us assume that both counties are identical in terms of their observed
(including their traffic laws) and unobserved characteristics. Let us suppose that state X decides to
reform its traffic law system and state Y does not change its law in response to the reform in X. A
researcher exploiting these policy changes to estimate the impact of seatbelt enforcement on traffic
fatalities would produce coefficients affected by the migration bias if this reform induces the riskiest
individuals who are most prone to accidents in county B to move to county A. This movement of
individuals across the state border due to the change in policy leads to the counties no longer being
identical as is required. We strongly believe that this is not a major concern in this paper due to the
high direct and psychic cost associated with migration. Therefore, the share of individuals induced
to relocate to nearby states due to a change in traffic rules is infinitesimal and should pose no threat
to the identification framework we employ.
There is also a likelihood that the county where the fatal accident occurs and is counted in our
data is different from the driver’s county of residence. This only poses a problem if it is done in a
systematic manner which inflates the fatality counts for one of the contiguous counties within a given
border pair7. For example, if state X imposes a steep beer tax, this may induce some individuals to
drive to the bordering county (Y) to drink. As such this could inflate the accident figures in state Y
and deflate the counts in state X. Mechanically, this would make the beer tax appear more effective
than it actually is.
There are two arguments that suggest that it is unlikely that this mechanism accounts for the re-
sults from the contiguous-county specification. First, to be plausible, the increased expected penalty
imposed by the new legislation must offset the time and monetary cost of driving across the bor-
7If the reason for driving across the border is independent of the existing laws, then this does not induce a bias.
For example, if an individual drives to the bordering county to visit families or for work and is involved in a drunk
driving fatal crash, this would not bias the specification.
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der8. As such, this would require very steep increases in the cost of drunk-driving associated with
law changes. We do not believe this could reasonable explain the big differences observed between
the estimates in tables 3 and 4. Secondly, legislations such as open container laws focus mainly on
where alcohol can be consumed, and should not induce big behavioral changes such as traveling to
a border state. However, the conventional estimates do not find this law to be effective, while the
contiguous-counties border-pair estimates suggest that this law reduces drunk-driving fatalities9.
As such, while we cannot rule out migration bias affecting the estimated parameters, the evidence
suggest that it does not violate the main conclusions.
4.4 Policy Implications
In this section, we provide back of the envelope calculations of the effectiveness of the various laws we
found to be effective in reducing driving related fatalities. To be consistent with the usual statistics
documented by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration(NHTSA), table 8 provides the
actual and potential effect of traffic laws in reducing total fatalities. The assumptions utilized in our
simulation mirrors those employed by the NHTSA. The actual lives saved can be interpreted as the
number of lives that would have been lost if the states that enacted the particular law, had decided
not to do so. This is simply calculated as the beta coefficient from panel 2 of table 4 weighted by the
population in the states that enacted these laws. We only present the result for the estimates that
are statistically significant. In contrast, the potential lives saved should be interpreted as the total
number of lives that would have been saved had the particular law been enacted in all states.
Rows 1 to 2 of this table provides yearly average estimates over the period 1986-2005. Columns
1 to 4 shows the effect of each law on the actual number of lives saved for all states who enacted
the law and the potential lives that could have been saved if the law was enacted as a federal
mandate10. The simulation suggest that on average, the four laws have saved about 3000 lives
yearly. However, there are a number of lives that were not saved because some of these laws are
not adopted universally11. As such, the effective laws only saved 48 percent of the lives that could
be saved from drunk-driving accidents with available legislative tools. With drunk-driving fatalities
averaging about 13,400 annually over the period, this suggests that these laws could have prevented
approximately 24 percent of these fatal accidents if they were uniformly utilized over the sample
period.
The evidence also suggests that there are gains to be made from adopting a uniform tax rate on
packaged beer. If the federal government had imposed a mandatory minimum of 20 cents per gallon
in 1986 (the average alcohol tax in 1986), they could have saved about 135 more lives annually12.
This small increase in the beer tax rate over the period would have reduced the level of drunk driving
fatalities by approximately 1 percent annually.
8There is also an informational cost for individuals to determine the laws in the bordering state.
9This is also supported by the plausible estimates we find in table 7 when we focused on laws unrelated to the cost
of consuming alcohol.
10These are presented as yearly averages over the sample period. The total is a multiple of 19.
11The zero tolerance law was the only law that was adopted universally before the end of the sample period.
12Calculated as the product of the affected population (per hundred thousand) with a beer tax below 0.2 over the
period, the average gap between the actual beer tax and 0.2 and the estimated impact of the beer tax on traffic
fatalities.
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Overall, the simulations indicate that there is still room to use existing laws to reduce drunk
driving fatalities. However, these laws must be further evaluated against any social cost they impose.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present new evidence on the effectiveness of traffic legislation on the rate of drunk-
driving fatalities. To robustly evaluate this issue and to assess the empirical limitations of previous
studies, the contiguous county-pair approach is employed. We argue that this approach offers sig-
nificant insight into the causal effect of each policy because of our ability to directly address the
issue of spatial heterogeneity that has biased previous estimates. Additionally, contiguous-counties
border-pair level analysis benefits from several empirical and efficiency advantages, that state-level
panels and time series analysis do not.
Our findings suggest that the the most effective legislations in reducing drunk-driving fatalities
are the non-pecuniary measures directly related to alcohol use, drunk driving or accident prevention;
such as a open container law, beer tax, license suspension or prison time for the first DUI incident
and alcohol limits for young drivers. Consequently, these laws can be employed as policy tools by
decision-makers to address the widespread public health issue of motor vehicle fatalities. A simple
simulation suggests that policymakers could have prevented about 24 percent of these fatal accidents
if these laws were uniformly enacted in 1986.
While this study does not solve all the problems in the literature and may have several limitations
of its own, we are optimistic that it will be insightful to future efforts examining this question. In
order for policymakers to implement policy aimed at combating this phenomenon, there is a need for
robust studies exploring the best practices that are most effective. This study makes a single step in
arriving at these solutions.
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6 Appendices
Table 3: Impact of Traffic Laws on Drunk Driving Fatalities (Conventional)
[1] [2] [3]
BAC Limit of .08 g/dL -0.44∗∗∗ -0.37 -0.36
(0.21) (0.40) (0.41)
Underage BAC Limit of .02 g/dL -0.39∗ -0.57∗ -0.55∗
(0.20) (0.29) (0.30)
Beer Tax Rate -0.94 -3.58 -3.69
(1.81) (2.87) (2.93)
Open Container Law -0.30 -0.50 -0.50
(0.30) (0.46) (0.47)
Keg Registration 0.15 -0.40 -0.39
(0.26) (0.39) (0.41)
1st DUI: Min Fine -0.00008 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.001)
1st DUI: Community Service -0.098 -0.23 -0.23
(0.17) (0.30) (0.31)
1st DUI: License Suspension -0.31 -0.36 -0.35
(0.41) (0.47) (0.49)
1st DUI: Mandates Prison -0.20 -0.48 -0.48
(0.22) (0.29) (0.30)
Obs 879 56,088 56,088
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes No No
State-Time Trend No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
R-squared 0.81 0.06 0.26
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Table 4: Impact of Traffic Laws on Drunk Driving Fatalities (Contiguous)
[1] [2]
BAC Limit of .08 g/dL -0.33 0.46
(0.21) (0.31)
Underage BAC Limit of .02 g/dL -1.14∗∗∗ -1.40∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.33)
Beer Tax Rate -16.24∗∗∗ -9.09∗∗
(2.49) (3.55)
Open Container Law -0.84∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.31)
Keg Registration -0.13 0.34
(0.27) (0.38)
1st DUI: Min Fine -0.001∗ 0.0005
(0.0007) (0.001)
1st DUI: Community Service -0.31 -0.24
(0.20) (0.29)
1st DUI: License Suspension -0.16 -0.49∗
(0.19) (0.27)
1st DUI: Mandates Prison -0.39∗ -0.73∗∗
(0.21) (0.29)
Controls Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No
County-Pair Year FE No Yes
R-squared 0.28 0.64
Obs 38,128 38,128
Table 5: Robustness Checks-Impact of Traffic Laws on Drunk Driving Fatalities (State)
Holidays[1] Fri and Sat 12-3AM[2] Rush Hour (Evening)[3]
BAC Limit of .08 g/dL -0.07∗∗ -0.033 -0.023
(0.031) (0.029) (0.016)
Underage BAC Limit of .02 g/dL -0.09∗∗∗ -0.014 0.025
(0.032) (0.03) (0.017)
Beer Tax Rate -0.31∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -0.041
(0.18) (0.15) (0.12)
Open Container Law -0.07∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.009
(0.03) (0.029) (0.016)
Keg Registration -0.009 -0.008 0.019
(0.035) (0.033) (0.019)
1st DUI: Min Fine -0.00003 -0.00006 0.000007
(0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00004)
1st DUI: Community Service -0.015 -0.04 0.006
(0.029) (0.027) (0.016)
1st DUI: License Suspension -0.045 -0.006 -0.022
(0.03) (0.03) (0.016)
1st DUI: Mandates Prison -0.07∗∗ -0.008 -0.02
(0.03) (0.029) (0.016)
Obs 879 879 879
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.55 0.62 0.45
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Table 6: Robustness Checks-Impact of Traffic Laws on Drunk Driving Fatalities (Contiguous)
Holidays[1] Fri and Sat 12-3AM[2] Rush Hour (Evening)[3]
BAC Limit of .08 g/dL 0.22 0.075 -0.073
(0.16) (0.11) (0.076)
Underage BAC Limit of .02 g/dL -0.31∗∗ -0.10 0.088
(0.13) (0.16) (0.066)
Beer Tax Rate 0.82 -2.19 -1.90
(1.27) (1.45) (1.18)
Open Container Law 0.0858 -0.12 0.045
(0.12) (0.15) (0.074)
Keg Registration -0.14 0.065 0.064
(0.15) (0.16) (0.087)
1st DUI: Min Fine 0.0002 -0.00065 0.00044
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003)
1st DUI: Community Service -0.117 -0.12 0.008
(0.11) (0.11) (0.07)
1st DUI: License Suspension -0.018 0.18 -0.15∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.14) (0.058)
1st DUI: Mandates Prison -0.028 -0.12 -0.022
(0.15) (0.11) (0.06)
Obs 38,128 38,128 38,128
Controls Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No
County-Pair Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.54
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Table 7: Robustness Checks, Non-Alcohol Related Laws
Conventional (State) Contiguous-Counties
Universe
Good GDL -0.30∗ -0.25
(0.17) (0.35)
Bike Helmet Laws -0.32∗ -0.59∗
(0.167) (0.35)
Seat-Belt Fine -0.32∗ -1.58∗
(0.167) (0.74)
Reduced Damages, SB No-Use .38 0.76
(0.36) (0.68)
Holidays
Good GDL -0.01 0.09
(0.17) (0.13)
Bike Helmet Laws -0.07∗∗ 0.15
(0.033) (0.13)
Seat-Belt Fine 0.003 0.21
(0.07) (0.25)
Reduced Damages, SB No-Use 0.16∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.058) (0.26)
Rush Hours
Good GDL -0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.07)
Bike Helmet Laws -0.01 -0.13
(0.02) (0.10)
Seat-Belt Fine -0.03 0.002
(0.04) (0.17)
Reduced Damages, SB No-Use 0.094∗∗∗ 0.09
(0.031) (0.14)
Fri & Sat 12-3AM
Good GDL -0.03 0.025
(0.03) (0.12)
Bike Helmet Laws -0.03 0.05
(0.03) (0.14)
Seat-Belt Fine -0.03 -0.44∗
(0.07) (0.26)
Reduced Damages, SB No-Use -0.043 -0.16
(0.054) (0.27)
Controls Yes Yes
State FE Yes No
Year FE Yes No
County-Pair Year FE No Yes
County FE No Yes
Table 8: Effectiveness of Traffic Legislations in Reducing Motor Vehicle Accidents
[1] [2] [3] [4]
License Mandatory Prison Open BAC Limit of 0.02
Suspension (DUI) Time (DUI) Container (Underage)
Total Lives Saved 785 460 1,576 227
Pot Lives Saved 1,297 1,932 2,700 371
Lives Saved (%) 60.5 24 58 61
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